Education in “The Republic” & “Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”

The role and significance of education with regard to governmental and social institutions is a subject that has interested political philosophers for millennia. In particular, the views of the quaint Greek philosopher Plato, as evidenced in The Republic, and of the pre-Ro creationtic philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau in his chat on the Arts and Sciences, present a striking juxtaposition of the two extremes of the ongoing philosophical and political debate over the function and quantify of education.In this paper, I ordain argue that Rousseaus repudiation of education, while flawed and offering no remedy to the ills it disparages, is superior inasmuch as it comes closer to the faithfulness of things than does Platos idealized conceptions. To do so, I will first examine Platos commentary of the role of education and its function in shaping the structure of rescript and government and in producing gistfelt citizens. I will because disclose Rousseaus view of education and the negative effects of the civilized culture which it produces, and apply this view, will start out to illustrate the naivete and over-idealization of Platos notions.Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate that it is Rousseaus view, rather than Platos, that is ultimately more significant in assessing the authentic (vs. idealized) merits (or lack thereof, in Rousseaus case) by which education should be judged with regard to the nurturance of close citizens. For Plato, the question of the role of education arises near the end of Book II (377e), after a discussion of two the necessary and consequent attributes of Socrates kallipolis or type City.Such a urban center, Socrates argues, will, before long, have wishing of both a specialization of labor (in order for the greatest level of renewal and luxury of goods to be achieved) and of the establishment of a class of Guardians to protect the city from its envious neighbors and maintain order within its walls (i. e. , to police a nd govern the city). This, in turn, leads inexorably to the question of what attributes the Ideal City will require of its Guardians, and how exceed to foster such attributes.The early, childhood education of the Guardians, Socrates argues, is the key. What, then, asks Socrates, should children be taught, and when? This quickly leads to a discussion of censorship. Socrates cites a number of questionable passages from Homer which cannot, he thinks, be allowed in education, since they represent dishonorable behavior and encourage the fear of death. The dramatic form of much of this poetry is overly suspect it puts unworthy dustup into the mouths of gods & heroes.Socrates suggests that what we would call direct quotation must be strictly express mail to morally-elevating speech. Nothing can be permitted that compromises the education of the childly Guardians, as it is they who will one day rule and protect the city, and whom the lesser-constituted citizens of the polis will attem pt to emulate, assimilating, via the onomatopoeical process of mimesis, to the Myth (or noble lie) of the Ideal City in which justice is achieved when everyone assumes their proper role in parliamentary law.The process of mimesis, is, of course, yet some other form of education, in which those of Iron and Bronze natures ar instructed and inspired by the superior intelligence and subject of the G old(a) and Silver members of the Guardian class. It is because a form of education without which the polis cannot operate. Thus, for Guardian and ordinary citizen alike, the education of the young and the continuing instruction of the citizenry atomic number 18 crucial. In addition to these aspects, Plato also conceives of another function of education, and one which is quite significant in its resemblance to Rousseaus views.For Plato, education and ethics are interdependent. To be ethical, in turn, requires a triple vogue movement away from immersion in concrete affairs to thinkin g and vision of unchanging order and structures (such as justice) and then movement punt from dialectic to participation and re-attachment in worldly affairs. It is a enticement to become an abstract scholar. But the vision of the good is the vision of what is good for oneself and the city of the common good.If one does not return to help his gadfly hu cosmos beings, he becomes selfish and in time will be less able to see what is good, what is best. An considerate devotion to the good requires an unselfish devotion to the realization of this good in human affairs. Just as the purpose of sagaciousness order and limits in ones own life is to start out about order and restraint in ones own character and desires, the understanding of justice requires application in the public sphere (through education). A man who forgets the polis is like a man who forgets he has a body.Plato thus advocates educating both the body and the city (for one needs both), not turning ones back on them. If education is, for Plato, the means by which man comes to fully make up (through society) his potential as a human being and by which society as a whole is in turn elevated, for Rousseau it is quite the opposite. Education, argues Rousseau, does not elevate the souls of men but rather corrodes them. The noble mimesis which lies at the heart of education in Platos kallipolis is for Rousseau merely a slavish imitation of the shopworn ideas of antiquity.The ill effects of this imitation are manifold. Firstly, argues Rousseau, when we devote ourselves to the learning of old ideas, we stifle our own creativity and originality. Where is there room for original thought, when, in our incessant efforts to impress one another with our erudition, we are forever and a day spout the ideas of others? In a world devoid of originality, the mark of greatness, intelligence, and virtue is trim to nothing more than our ability to please others by reciting the wisdom of the past.This speech patt ern on originality is in marked contrast with Plato, who finds no value in originality, deeming it antithetical to a polis otherwise unified by shared Myths of the Ideal City and of Metals. Rousseau rejects this unity, rightly denouncing it as a form of thraldom , in which humanitys inherent capacity for spontaneous, original self-expression is replaced with the yoking. of the mind and the will to the ideas of others, who are often long dead.In addition to suppressing the innate human need for originality, education (and the appetite for culture and sophistication that it engenders) causes us to conceal ourselves, to entomb our true natures, desires, and emotions. We become artificial and shallow, using our social amenities and our cognition of literature, etc. , to present a pleasing but deceptive pillow slip to the world, a notion quite at odds with the ideas of Plato.We assume, in Rousseaus words, the appearance of all virtues, without being in possession of one of them. Fina lly, argues Rousseau, rather than alter our minds and bodies and (a critical point) moving us towards that which is ethical, as Plato contends, education and civilization unmanlike and weaken us physically and (perhaps most significantly) mentally, and cause us, in this weakness, to lower oneself to every manner of depravity and injustice against one another. External ornaments, writes Rousseau, are no less foreign to virtue, which is the strength and activity of the mind.The honest man is an athlete, who loves to wrestle stark naked he scorns all those vile trappings, which hold the exertion of his strength, and were, for the most part, invented only to conceal some deformity. Virtue, as oppose to Platos conception, is an action, and results not from the imitation inherent in mimesis, but rather in the activity in the exercise of the body, mind and soul. Education, however, demands imitation, demands a modeling upon what has been successful. How, then, do we rightly assess the merits of education with regard to its it molding of the public character in its ability to produce good citizens.The answer to this hinges, I submit, on how we choose to define the good citizen. Clearly, if obedience (or assimilation to a political ideology, or perhaps voluntary servitude) is the hallmark of the good citizen, then we must regard Platos disposition towards education as the proper one. However, obedience, patronage its obvious centrality to the smooth operation of society (as we would have social pandemonium were it completely absent), has its useful limits. Over-assimilation to a political idea or intention is every bit as dangerous indeed, far more so as the utter under-assimilation of anarchy.For those inclined to dispute this, I would urge them to brush up the history of Nazi Germ any(prenominal) as perhaps the definitive example of what sad, awful spectacles of injustice we humans are capable of when we trade in our mental and spiritual autonomy for th e convenient apathy and faceless namelessness of the political ideal. Furthermore, if , as Rousseau contends, our civilization is such that, Sincere friendship, real esteem, and accurate confidence in each other are banished from among men, what is the quality of the society for which education any modern education purports to prepares us?When, Jealousy, suspicion, fear coldness, reserve, hate, and fraud lie constantly concealed under a uniform and deceitful veil of politeness, what is left to us to educate citizens for, other than the pleasure we seem to derive in scholarly displays of hoary knowledge? If we remove the civility from civilization, what remains to us that any education will remedy?